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ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE TRIAL 
COURT'S RULING ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Defendants' Statement of Facts does not contradict the 
Statement of Facts set forth by the Plaintiffs in their appeal 
brief. Defendants do, however, omit important facts and, at the 
same time, ask the court to focus on facts that are irrelevant. 
Because the Defendants do not claim to disagree with Plaintiffs' 
fact statement, Plaintiffs will address some of the omitted and 
irrelevant facts within the body of this response to Defendants' 
reply brief. The remaining omitted facts have been laid out in 
Plaintiffs' appeal brief and in their memorandum in opposition to 
summary judgment. 
Defendants argue in their brief that the Plaintiffs' appeal 
should fail for the following reasons: A) Plaintiffs have not 
disputed the facts of the closing; B) Plaintiffs did not prove in 
their reply memorandum to Defendants' motion for summary judgment 
that the Earnest Money Agreement (Agreement) exists to support 
their suit. 
A. The Plaintiffs have presented factual issues surrounding the 
closing that preclude summary judgment. 
(1) The Closing Instructions. Defendants failed to mention 
in their argument that the Plaintiffs submitted closing 
instructions, prior to the closing of the transaction, which 
protected the Plaintiffs' right to pursue their claims. The 
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effect of these instructions and the intent and understanding of 
the parties regarding these instructions are issues of fact 
related to the closing. 
Plaintiffs have based their claims in part upon the actions 
of the Defendants prior to closing and at the closing, in 
addition to the documents, including the "closing instructions." 
Plaintiffs set forth the facts of Defendants' actions and their 
possible legal consequence in Plaintiff's appeal brief and in 
their memorandum in opposition to summary judgment. For example, 
Defendants do not claim that they did not see the closing 
instructions or fail to understand their meaning and intent. 
Defendants had no doubt that the Plaintiffs would not have closed 
the transaction if the Defendants had objected to the terms of 
the closing instructions.(R. 169) The Defendants do not claim 
that they stated any objections to the Plaintiffs at closing or 
that they said or did anything that would indicate that they did 
not agree to the terms of the closing instructions. 
Accordingly, the following issues of fact related to the 
closing remain: 
1. Whether the defendants intended and understood that the 
Plaintiffs' closing instructions were to survive the closing 
and protect Plaintiffs' claims concerning the "bargain." 
2. Whether the defendants understood and agreed to close 
subject to the terms of the closing instructions. 
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Defendants argue that because the closing instructions were 
not signed by the defendants or incorporated into the final 
documents, they are irrelevant. Defendants submit no support for 
this argument. Indeed, the closing instructions did not need to 
be signed by the Defendants in order for the instructions to be 
enforceable and valid. See 17A Am. Jur. 2d Section 185 (parties 
may become bound by terms of a contract, even though they do not 
sign it, where their assent is otherwise indicated). Nor did the 
closing instructions need to be incorporated into the deed to 
survive the closing. Both the Earnest Money Agreement and the 
Real Estate Purchase Contract have provisions stating that they 
survive the closing even though they were never incorporated into 
the deed. 
(2) The Earnest Money Agreement. The Defendants argue that 
the Earnest Money Agreement was not in existence at the time of 
the closing because it had expired on October 21, 1993. 
Plaintiffs maintain that the Defendants, by agreeing to a later 
closing date, effectively extended the closing date, waived any 
claim that the Agreement expired and waived any right to enforce 
the earlier closing date. Waiver is a "highly fact-dependent 
question." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994). 
Therefore, additional issues of fact remain concerning the 
closing: 
1. Whether the Defendants and the Plaintiffs agreed to extend 
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the closing date. 
2. Whether the Defendants waived any claim that the Agreement 
had expired prior to the actual closing date. 
3. Whether the Defendants waived any right to enforce an 
earlier closing date. 
Defendants' contention that the Plaintiffs raised no issues 
of fact concerning the closing is erroneous. Their argument on 
this point is without merit. 
B. Plaintiffs were not given the opportunity to prove the 
existence of the Earnest Money Agreement. 
Defendants7 argue that Plaintiffs's claims are utterly 
dependent upon the existence of the Earnest Money Agreement. 
This is not true. As one can see from the briefs filed in this 
case, the history of this deal involved more than the signing of 
the Earnest Money Agreement. The Earnest Money Agreement in 
whole or in part is only one factor of the Plaintiffs' fraud and 
misrepresentation claims. As set forth in Plaintiffs' opposing 
memorandum and in Plaintiffs' brief, the actions of the 
Defendants and statements other than the Earnest Money Agreement 
form the basis for these claims. 
Defendants argue that the trial court's ruling granting the 
Defendants' summary judgment is a correct one because the 
Plaintiffs failed to prove the existence of the Earnest Money 
Agreement. 
A motion for summary judgment is appropriate only if there 
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is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Shafir v. 
Harriaan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah App.1994). No deference is 
given to the trial court's ruling. Id. The facts and the 
reasonable inferences therefrom are reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the losing party. Id. 
To defeat Defendants' motion for summary judgment, 
Plaintiffs were not required to "prove" their case; they had only 
to "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 
element essential to that party's case, and on which that party 
would bear the burden of proof at trial." Schafir v. Harriaan, 
879 P.2d 1384, 1391 (Utah App. 1994). Only one competent sworn 
statement disputing the averments of the other party is 
sufficient to create an issue of fact. Redevelopment Agency v. 
Daskalas, 758 P.2d 1112 (Utah App. 1989). 
In their memorandum in opposition to summary judgment, 
Plaintiffs presented meaningful documentary evidence, affidavits 
and deposition statements showing that there were issues of fact 
regarding the Earnest Money Agreement, including, but not limited 
to the following: 1) whether the parties closed the transaction 
subject to closing instructions which referred to the bargain 
contained in the Earnest Money Agreement; 2) whether Defendants, 
by their actions, extended the closing date of the Earnest Money 
Agreement; 3) whether the Defendants committed fraud and 
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negligent misrepresentation; and 4) whether the Defendants' fraud 
and negligent misrepresentation disarm the doctrine of merger. 
The Defendants' argument that the Plaintiffs' appeal should 
fail because they did not present evidence sufficient to prove 
their claims is without merit. Plaintiffs' appeal is based on a 
summary judgment ruling; the Plaintiffs were deprived of an 
evidentiary and of any opportunity to prove the facts supporting 
their complaint. However, it is clear that Plaintiffs did 
produce sufficient evidence to establish the elements of their 
claims at the time of summary judgment. 
II. DEFENDANTS' BRIEF TACITLY ACKNOWLEDGES THAT GENUINE ISSUES 
OF FACT REMAIN WHICH RENDER THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ERRONEOUS. 
In Plaintiffs' brief, Plaintiff laid out genuine and 
remaining issues of fact. In their response brief, Defendants 
respond by arguing or ignoring the facts, not the law, thereby 
tacitly acknowledging that factual issues remain. 
A. The Factual Issue of Defendants' Breach. 
Defendants argue that they did not breach the Earnest Money 
Agreement because the description of property in it did not 
include the parcel of land designated as "Lot 15." Defendants' 
statement is in error. As stated previously in Plaintiffs' 
Statement of Facts section of their brief, the Earnest Money 
Agreement included a document entitled "Addendum/Counteroffer" 
which stated that it was incorporated into the Agreement and 
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which contained specific language referring to Lot 15 as part of 
the property to be included in the purchase. 
Defendants' statement that the Earnest Money Agreement 
itself did not refer to Lot 15 is misleading, as is Defendants' 
omission of the fact that Plaintiffs and Defendants believed that 
the Earnest Money Agreement property description included and 
described Lot 15 at the time the Agreement was prepared and 
executed. Whether Defendants breached their Agreement is a 
question of fact which can only be resolved by a trier of fact. 
B. The Waiver of Defendants. 
Defendants argue that the Earnest Money Agreement expired on 
its own terms on October 21, 1993. The basis for this claim is 
that the Defendants did not sign a written extension. A signed, 
written extension is not necessary. See 17A Am. Jur. 2d Section 
185. 
A waiver may be express or implied. Soter's v. Deseret 
Federal Savings & Loan, 857 P.2d 935, 941 (Utah 1993). A party 
asserting waiver need not prove that the other party intended to 
waive a particular right, only that the waiving party intended to 
relinquish a right. Id. This legal question is "intensely fact-
dependent." Soter's at 940. The trier of fact need only to 
"determine whether the totality of the circumstances 'warrants 
the inference of relinquishment.'" (Emphasis added.) Soter' s at 
942. 
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In this case, Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff Maynard 
stated in his affidavit that the parties met, were unable to 
close and agreed to meet again, which they did on October 25, 
1993. Defendants' brief at 11. Defendants then state that 
Plaintiff Maynard did not testify that the Defendants did not 
agree to extend the Earnest Money Agreement and "in fact, they 
did not." Defendants' brief at 11. Defendants offer no 
refutation of Plaintiff Maynard's' affidavit testimony other than 
their claim, on appeal, that they did not so agree. Defendants 
do not deny that the two meetings took place and that the closing 
occurred at a later date with their agreement. Defendants do not 
claim to have objected to a later closing date. The facts would 
show that Defendants conducted themselves at all times as if the 
Earnest Money Agreement continued in full force and they did not 
allege that it had terminated prior to October 25, 1993 until 
their motion for summary judgment. 
Defendants have not made a legal argument on the issue of 
waiver; they presented a factual argument. Obviously the 
Defendants recognize that the issue of waiver can be decided only 
by addressing the facts of this case. 
C. The Doctrine of Merger and the Closing Instructions 
Defendants claim that whether or not the Earnest Money 
Agreement's closing date was extended is moot because of the 
doctrine of merger and abrogation. As support for their claim, 
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they cite Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994), 
wherein the court affirmed the doctrine of merger and its 
applicability when the acts to be performed by the seller relate 
only to the delivery of title to the buyer. 
In Schafir, the plaintiffs purchased a home previously owned 
by the defendants. After the purchase, plaintiffs discovered, 
among other defects, that the plumbing did not conform to code. 
Plaintiffs claimed that the defendants breached a warranty 
statement contained in Section C of the Earnest Money Agreement. 
At the time of closing, plaintiffs received and accepted a 
warranty deed for the property. The court held that, under the 
doctrine of merger and pursuant to the abrogation clause in the 
Earnest Money Agreement, the warranty contained in the Earnest 
Money Agreement was extinguished by the warranty deed accepted at 
the closing. 
While Plaintiffs certainly accept the existence and 
definition of the doctrine of merger in Utah, the facts of the 
case at bar differ significantly from the facts in Schafir. 
Plaintiffs are not alleging that it did not receive title to the 
property that Defendants ultimately conveyed at the closing nor 
are Plaintiffs claiming defects in the property discovered only 
after the purchase. Plaintiffs filed suit because they entered 
into a real estate transaction for certain property allegedly 
owned by the Defendants. Following weeks of negotiations and 
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representations by Defendants, including an executed Earnest 
Money Agreement, Plaintiffs learned that the Defendants would not 
convey a crucial lot because they did not own it. Plaintiffs 
elected to tender performance and sued for breach, but Plaintiffs 
tendered such performance only after submitting closing 
instructions reserving their claims and ensuring that the 
applicable terms of the Earnest Money Agreement survived the 
closing. 
In Secor v. Knight, 719 P.2d 790 (Utah 1986), the Knights 
purchased property in a subdivision on which they built a home 
with a rental apartment in the basement. Other owners in the 
subdivision filed for an injunctive order against the Knights on 
the basis that a rental apartment violated the restrictive 
covenants of the subdivision. The Knights filed a third-party 
complaint against the developer alleging fraud. Following an 
evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the developer had 
not been fraudulent, despite conflicting evidence, and thus, the 
doctrine of merger applied to bar the Knights' recovery. Secor at 
794. Although it was not a clear cut case, the Supreme Court did 
not disturb the trial court's findings because the evidence did 
not preponderate to the level that a manifest injustice had 
occurred. Id. However, the Supreme Court noted that the 
Knights, the purchasers of the property, might have been able to 
avoid the "harsh result" of the merger doctrine if they would 
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have been more diligent in protecting their rights. Secor at 
795. 
In this case, Plaintiffs have diligently protected their 
rights by raising their objections and concerns and by submitting 
closing instructions giving the Defendants notice of their intent 
to pursue their claims against the Defendants. 
The Defendants' only basis for their contention that the 
closing instructions fail to protect the Plaintiffs7 claim from 
merger and abrogation is that Defendants did not sign or 
incorporate them. As discussed previously, it is not necessary 
for the Defendants to have signed or incorporated the closing 
instructions in order for them to be effective. 
Whether the parties intended the closing instructions 
protected the Plaintiffs' rights and claims and whether the 
parties closed subject to the conditions in the closing 
instructions are not issues relating to the title of the property 
Defendants ultimately conveyed. They are collateral issues to 
which the doctrine of merger does not apply. See Secor at 793. 
Finally, Plaintiffs have sued on the basis of negligent 
misrepresentation and fraud. The Defendants acknowledge that in 
situations where fraud is present, the doctrine of merger and 
abrogation will not apply. 
Consequently, issues of fact remain which require an 
evidentiary hearing and which cannot be resolved appropriately 
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via summary judgment. 
D. Defendants' Negligence and Misrepresentation 
Defendants do not address these claims in their brief; they 
have chosen to argue that the Earnest Money Agreement and its 
termination or merger is the sole factor for the court of appeals 
to consider. The Plaintiffs request that the court take note 
that the Defendants do not dispute the facts as set forth by the 
Plaintiffs. In their Statement of Facts, the Defendants have 
elected to omit facts, but they offer no evidence that would 
contradict the facts presented by Plaintiffs. 
As discussed above and in Plaintiffs' brief, genuine issues 
of fact remained at the time the lower court entered summary 
judgment. Consequently, Defendants' brief does not and cannot 
address only issues of law; they only argue facts. The order of 
summary judgment is inappropriate and must be vacated. 
II. THE JUDGE'S ORDER IMPROPERLY CONTAINS FACTUAL FINDINGS. 
Defendants' argument that the order entered on summary 
judgment was proper consists of restating the order and making 
the statement that the order does not contain factual findings. 
Defendants offer no other support. 
The Plaintiff is at a loss to explain how the Defendants, in 
good faith, can claim that a summary judgment order that reaches 
findings based on issues of honesty, good faith and fair dealing, 
and that ignores the actions and statements of Defendants, as 
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well as the totality of the circumstances, is a proper one that 
deals only with questions of law. The lower court's order, as 
prepared by the Defendants, makes a factual finding on the 
applicability of merger, despite Plaintiffs' claims of fraud. The 
order makes a factual finding that the Defendants did not breach 
their Agreement with Plaintiffs, while, at the same time, 
acknowledging that the Defendants did not convey the property 
promised in the Earnest Money Agreement. The order makes a 
factual finding on the effectiveness of the closing instructions, 
without addressing, among other factors, the intent and 
understanding of the parties. The order makes a finding that 
there was no waiver, even though, by definition of this court, 
the issue of waiver is a question of fact. The order makes a 
factual finding that the Defendants did not engage in 
misrepresentation or fraud. 
Defendants' statement of propriety is not sufficient to save 
the order. The order clearly contains factual findings that are 
inappropriate on summary judgment. 
III. THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES WAS IMPROPER. 
A. The Defendants have no basis to request attorney fees. 
The Defendants are not entitled to an award of attorney 
fees. Plaintiffs addressed this issue at length in their brief 
and will herein address only Defendants' use of Redeve1opment 
Agency v. Daskalas. 785 P.2d 1112 (Utah App.1989) as support for 
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their argument that they should be allowed to claim attorney fees 
on the basis of the attorney fees provision of the Earnest Money 
Agreement while, at the same time, asserting that the Earnest 
Money Agreement merged into the final documents at closing and 
was thus extinguished. 
In Redevelopment, the Tenants sought compensation from the 
Owners of the real property for "bonus value" based upon the 
Tenants' purported renewal of their leases. The court found that 
the Tenants failed to comply with the terms of the leases 
required to effectively renew;, thus they were precluded from 
receiving bonus value payments. Jd at 1125. Because the Owners 
incurred costs to enforce the terms of the lease in order to 
withstand the Tenants' claims for additional monies, the court 
held that the Owners were entitled to fees under the attorney 
fees provision of the lease. Although the lease had terminated 
upon the occupation of the premises by the Redevelopment Agency, 
the court held that because the Owners did not rescind or void 
the lease, the law that "a party who deems a contract void for 
one purpose cannot subsequently rely upon that contract to 
support another purpose" was inapplicable. Id. 
Defendants' reliance on Redevelopment for their claim of 
attorney fees is not well-taken. In Redevelopment, the contract 
was a lease agreement with which the Tenants failed to comply. 
The Owners did not claim that the lease agreements were void; 
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they did not seek to avoid any of their responsibilities under 
the leases and then invoke the leases to recover from the 
Tenants. 
In the case at bar, Defendants were the ones who breached 
the Earnest Money Agreement by failing to convey the property 
promised and bargained for in the Agreement. 
Unlike the Owners in Redevelopment, Defendants have not 
incurred costs and fees to enforce the Earnest Money Agreement. 
Defendants claim that the Plaintiffs breached the abrogation 
provision of the Agreement when they filed their suit and that in 
seeking to enforce that provision, the Defendants have incurred 
expenses. Plaintiff did not "breach" the abrogation provision of 
the Agreement. Plaintiffs cannot "breach" where there is no 
contractual obligation: the doctrine of merger and abrogation is 
a legal fiction that may or may not apply according to the facts. 
See Secor. Also, unlike the Owners in Redevelopment, the 
Defendants have claimed that the Earnest Money Agreement is no 
longer enforceable because of the doctrine of merger and the 
abrogation clause contained in the Agreement. 
Consequently, this case is similar to the situation of the 
plaintiffs in Schafir who sought to enforce the warranty 
provision of the Earnest Money Agreement. Schafir v. Harricran, 
879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994). The court held that because the 
Earnest Money Agreement merged into the final closing documents, 
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the plaintiffs could not assert the warranty provision in the 
Agreement. The plaintiffs could only assert any claims they may 
have had under the warranty deed produced and accepted at the 
closing. 
Accordingly, if Defendants are correct in their assertion of 
merger, then the abrogation clause ceased to exist at the time of 
closing and Defendants cannot claim that the Plaintiffs somehow 
breached it at a later date. 
B. The award of attorney fees was an abuse of discretion by the 
lower court. 
While Plaintiffs agree that an award of attorney fees should 
not be overturned absent a "clear abuse of discretion," an "award 
made without adequate supporting evidence constitutes an abuse of 
discretion and must be overruled." Redevelopment Agency v. 
Daskalas, 758 P.2d 1112 (Utah App. 1989). In the Redevelopment 
case, the appeals court noted that the attorney fee affidavits 
were quite detailed and specified the work actually performed in 
connection with the litigation. Redevelopment at 1126. However, 
the court reversed the lower court's ruling on attorney fees 
because u[i]t takes only one competent sworn statement to dispute 
the averments on the other side of the controversy and create an 
issue of fact.'' Id. 
In this case, the attorney fee affidavits submitted to the 
lower court were not detailed, nor did they specify which hours 
applied to which claim. Plaintiffs filed an objection and an 
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affidavit from another attorney supporting their objections. 
Although Mr. Aagard filed a reply, Mr. Biesinger never responded 
to Plaintiffs' objections. 
Plaintiffs addressed the specific inadequacies of the fee 
affidavits in their brief and in their objection filed with the 
lower court; for example, the fee affidavits contain fees and 
costs unattached to enforcing the abrogation provision of the 
Earnest Money Agreement, the fee affidavits include time spent on 
unsuccessful motions, the billing statements fail to break out 
the spent by counsel on each of Plaintiff's claims, the fee 
affidavits included unrecoverable costs, and the fee affidavits 
contain inflated or fraudulent charges. 
Defendants' fee affidavits are insufficient to support the 
lower court's award of fees; in addition, Plaintiffs have 
submitted objections and a sworn statement that is more than 
sufficient to create an issue of fact. The lower court abused its 
discretion in awarding attorney fees without adequate basis and 
in the face of competent objections. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' response brief fails to provide the court with 
any justification for the lower court's ruling on summary 
judgment. Because of the importance and numerosity of the 
remaining issues of fact that were before the trial court, 
Defendants are reduced, in their brief, to repeating the trial 
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court's order and findings, as if doing so will convince the 
appeals court to ignore the standard of review, the facts, and 
the procedures of this case. Defendants do not dispute 
Plaintiffs' Statement of Fact; they omit key facts and focus on 
inconsequential ones. 
Plaintiffs provided the lower court with more than 
sufficient evidence to establish the existence of each element of 
their claims. Plaintiffs objected with sworn affidavits to 
Defendants' fee affidavits. Before the trial court, Defendants 
failed to meet their burden of proving that no genuine issues of 
fact existed. Defendants cannot reasonably contend that the 
appeals court should turn away from such an obviously improper 
order as that entered by the trial court in this case. 
Plaintiffs respectfully request that the court vacate the 
trial court's order and remand the case for trial. 
Dated this 20th day of September, 1995. 
Robe rtxl^ V^^ idfe 
Attorney for Appellants 
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